In his paper, Procreative Beneficence, Julian Savulescu argues for the principle that we should select the best possible child when having children. In this paper I will explain his argument for this principle. I will also evaluate three different interpretations of the argument and explain my objections to both. Then I will explain my interpretation of the argument and offer an improved conclusion and revised principle. Savulescu does make a convincing argument but for something weaker than procreative beneficence that I will call procreative benignity.

The first premise is that it is important that we provide people with the means useful to any plan of life (420). The reasoning behind this is that people deserve the ability to live whatever conception of the good life they decide. Savulescu calls these “general purpose means”. Allen Buchanen is referenced for this point and further clarification is given in the footnotes: “Buchanon and colleagues argue in a parallel way for the permissibility of genetic manipulation to allow children to live the best life possible”. Instead of genetic manipulation, Savulescu is arguing for selection based on genetics.

The next step is to acknowledge that genetics can prevent someone from living a good life. Savulescu sites several different genes that can have this effect. After this is accepted with the first premise, the eponymous principle can be accepted. The full argument is as follows:

P1: It is important to supply people with the means to live any plan of life

P2: Genetics can prevent or allow someone to live a good life

C: We should select the children with the best possible genetics

In the next few paragraphs I will argue against the validity of the argument. The main point being that there is a significant difference between the means to live any plan of life and the means to live the best possible life.

There are two ways of interpreting “any plan of life” which lead to different objections to the argument. The less realistic interpretation is that Savulescu really means “any plan of life” including professional athletics, academia, or even sainthood. In this case the premise P1 would be false because it is not important that everybody have the potential to become a doctor or NBA player. It would be ridiculous to claim a lack of ability to live a good life because your genetics don’t resemble those of Lebron James. If this were the correct interpretation, the principle would also need to be altered slightly. Choosing the best child would instead be choosing the one with the most good plans of life available. In other words an average child should be selected over a child gifted in one aspect but limited in others.

The second interpretation is argued by Buchanon and mentioned in the footnotes. That we should select the child with best possible life. This would call for selecting a child with Lebron James athleticism at the cost of intelligence and memory. This limits the options of the child and would be disastrous if they were not keen on athletics. A selection like this could also encroach on the child’s freedom to pursue their conception of the good life. For these reasons it would be wrong that we are obligated to make this selection. This is likely the belief Savulescu holds because it does lead to a conclusion like procreative beneficence.

The third and reasonable interpretation is that “any plan of life” means any life that could be available to everyone. Some examples would be lives of hedonism, charity, or studying. In this case the premise is true because it is important that people have the means to live whatever life they choose within reason. The problem now is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The natural conclusion would instead be that we should select children that have the means to live a good life, or procreative benignity. The obligations of this principle only include selecting out traits that could prevent someone from living a good life. The idea that it is important to give people the means to live a variety of good lives so they can choose which to pursue is redundant. If someone is living what seems like a good life but not a life they want, then it is not really a good life. This is why my suggested conclusion does not explicitly mention the ability to live a variety of lives.

Savulescu uses frequent examples to solidify his argument so I will address one of his examples arguing for the selection of non-disease traits. He states that a poor memory could prevent someone from living a good life by causing them to forget important things. He argues because of this there is an obligation to test and select the embryo with the best memory (420).  This is unnecessary because people do not need the best available memory to live a good life, they only need a memory that is good enough. The bad memory described in this example could be considered a disease trait. Savulescu never makes an argument for the obligation to select extreme traits like photographic memory or genius intelligence despite his principle calling for the selection of such traits when available.

The controversial extension Savulescu makes to non-disease traits would be much more limited with procreative benignity because people do not need exceptional traits to live a good life. Selecting traits that bring people above average would never be obligatory. This more accurately reflects the opinions of the public and dodges objections, such as the “arms race objection”, that only apply to enhancements. Savulescu makes a convincing argument for a wider range of enhancements but takes it too far in the culminating principle.

 

Word Count: 954

Reference:

Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children” 2001