In Bedke’s paper Might All Normativity be Queer he applies Mackie’s “argument from queerness” to more than the mere categorical imperative’s that Mackie applies them to. Bedke begins by giving his interpretation of Mackie’s objection because it is crucial to understanding his extension of it.  The queerness objection is that if there were objective moral values they would have completely different properties than anything else in the universe. Further, discovering these objective values would require us to drastically change our perception of the universe. If our lives are sufficient with a simpler understanding of morality, it is better to stick with that.

            To show that all reasons and values are also queer, it is necessary to understand what it is about moral imperatives that make them queer. The Moral Realist believes that objective values are independent of the people that must follow them. In any situation, there is a moral fact that favours a particular action and disfavours another one. Bedke writes that the queerness comes from an inability to describe what the moral fact is and how it favours certain actions.

            Philosophers that reject objective moralities on queerness tend to accept subjective, or hypothetical moralities because it is more believable to think that someone will act to advance their ends. It is easy to see a subjective morality only existing inside one person’s head so it is not intuitive to ask the same questions they ask about objective moralities.

Bedke uses one person with conflicting values to show that the reason we do something is still separate from us even if we are furthering our own goals. One reason favours an action while the second reason favours a different action. If there can be competing reasons for one person to act in different ways then these reasons are at least partially independent from that person. If reasons were only dependent on the person and their circumstances, then that person would only have reason to do one thing. If the reason is independent from the person the same queerness arises. What kind of entity is that reason and what would it mean to discover it?

Although I am skeptical the entire queerness objection I will only question Bedke’s extension of it assuming the original objection true. My suspicion stems from the belief that it is the universality of objective values that makes them queer. Something that is always existing everywhere is more queer to me than something that exists for brief moments in specific spots although both are indescribable.

I do not think the reasons I used a year ago are lingering somewhere, decaying. If reasons exist they could poof in and out of existence without anyone noticing unlike objective moral laws. Bedke could argue that this is an insignificant distinction because I still could not describe what those reasons are. I would contend that the entire argument from queerness is dependent on a subjective opinion about how queer something is. I see that reasons are slightly queer, but they’re not so queer that I would abandon them as soon as I abandon objective morality.